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The Society of Professional Journalists, Utah Headlin-
ers Chapter ("SPJ"), submits this brief as amicus curiae pursuant 
to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and by leave 
of this Court. 
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS 
The SPJ is an association of Utah journalists and news 
organizations dedicated to protecting the constitutional rights 
of freedom of speech and of the press. This case presents three 
paramount issues: the scope of state and federal constitutional 
protection for expression of opinion about a matter of public 
controversy in the editorial pages of one of the State's distin-
guished newspapers, whether heretofore sound journalistic prac-
tices such as prepublication legal review and publishing both 
sides of a controversy can be probative of actual malice, and 
what constitutes defamatory meaning as a matter of Utah law. 
Resolution of these issues carries profound practical 
significance for the working press. Each day Utah journalists 
employ thousands of words, images, and sounds to describe and 
comment upon current events affecting the citizens of the State. 
In many instances the reporting involves controversial issues and 
personalities. To comment freely and serve fully the free 
expression values of discovery and dissemination of truth and of 
fostering informed self-government, press commentary requires the 
breathing space to engage in "debate on public issues [that] 
-1-
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open." New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
The biting chill of the Utah Court of Appeals decision 
in this case represents a substantial retreat from the New York 
Times ideal. If allowed to stand, the Court of Appeals decision 
will inhibit, weaken, and narrow public debate in Utah. Accord-
ingly, SPJ has a vital interest in this case. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals decision was filed on May 28, 1992 
and is published at 835 P.2d 179. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1992 Supp.). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Amicus Curiae SPJ adopts the questions presented in the 
Brief of Petitioners. In particular, this brief addresses: 
1. Did the Court of Appeals err when it refused to 
consider whether statements in newspaper political editorial col-
umns that an elected official changed his position on an issue of 
public concern after a political campaign are protected opinion 
under Article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err when it decided that 
statements in newspaper political editorial columns that an 
elected official changed his position on an issue of public con-
cern after a political campaign are not protected opinion under 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution? 
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3. Did the Court of Appeals err in suggesting that a 
newspaper publisher seeking prepublication legal review of an 
editorial column is evidence of actual malice? 
4. Did the Court of Appeals err in suggesting that a 
newspaper's publication of a rebuttal letter to the editor is 
evidence that an accompanying editorial column was published with 
actual malice? 
5. Did the Court of Appeals err when it held that a 
statement in a newspaper editorial column that an elected offi-
cial during a political campaign "attempt[ed] to manipulate the 
press" is capable of defamatory meaning under Utah law? 
Whether statements are constitutionally privileged 
opinion because they are not susceptible of being proved true or 
false, whether evidence is probative of actual malice, and 
whether a statement is capable of defamatory meaning are all 
questions of law, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S.Ct. 
2695, 2707-08 (1990) (opinion); Harte-Hanks Communication, Inc. 
v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685 (1989) (actual malice); Cox v. 
Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988) (defamatory meaning). 
Accordingly, the standard of review for each issue is one of 
legal correctness. 
1-This Court recently wrote in a defamation case: "The existence of a privi-
lege is a question of law for the court." Russell v. Thomson Newspapers. 
Inc., 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 16 (1992). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTE 
Constitutional and statutory provisions whose interpre-
tation is determinative are: 
Article I, section 15, Utah Constitution: 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal 
prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evi-
dence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury 
that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was 
published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have 
the right to determine the law and the fact. 
First Amendment, United States Constitution: 
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-2(1) (1988): 
"Libel" means a malicious defamation, expressed 
either by printing or by signs or pictures or the like, 
tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to 
impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation, 
or publish the natural defects of one who is alive, and 
thereby to expose him to public hatred, contempt or 
ridicule. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Amicus curiae SPJ adopts the Statement of the Case and 
Statement of Facts set forth in the Brief of Petitioners. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Daily Spectrum Op-Ed columns commenting on respon-
dent having changed his position on municipal power are not on 
their face capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. Respondent 
complains about the columns' connotation, alleging that they 
-4. 
suggest he misled the public. Even if such an implication is a 
reasonable inference from the columns, the implication is pro-
tected opinion under Article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitu-
tion and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The Court of Appeals' refusal to address state consti-
tutional protection for opinion on the ground that this issue was 
not raised in the trial court is wrong as matter of fact and law. 
The issue was, in fact, raised in the trial court as an affirma-
tive defense. Moreover, in Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 
1988), a defamation case, this Court declared that the judgment 
of the trial court may be affirmed "on a ground other than that 
relied on by that court." ICd. at 561. 
This Court should initially address whether the Utah 
Constitution protects the Op-Ed columns. The federal constitu-
tional analysis should be undertaken only if state law is not 
dispositive. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782-84 (Utah 
1991). 
Protection for expression of opinion has roots in the 
common law fair comment privilege, which has been recognized in 
Utah. Williams v. Standard-Examiner Publishing Co., 83 Utah 31, 
27 P.2d 1 (1933). For almost sixteen years, based largely on 
dictum from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), 
lower federal courts and state courts developed a First Amendment 
privilege for opinion. However, in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal 
Co. , 110 S.Ct. 2698 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held 
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that there is no independent constitutional privilege for opin-
ion; instead, statements are not actionable under the First 
Amendment if they cannot be proven false. 
Milkovich left the scope of protection for previously 
sheltered opinion arguably diminished and uncertain. This 
unsettled state of the law has led to efforts seeking state con-
stitutional protection. At least one such effort since Milkovich 
has been successful. See Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 78 N.Y. 
2d 184, 567 N.E.2d 1270, cert, denied. 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991). 
We urge this Court to determine the scope of protection for 
expression of opinion under the Utah Constitution. 
Article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution should 
be interpreted to protect statements of opinion. Whether state-
ments receive such protection should turn on a totality of the 
circumstances analysis that includes reading the statement as a 
whole and considering the broad context of the setting in which 
the statement appears. Where, as here, the statements 
(1) comment on the actions of an elected political official on a 
matter of significant public controversy, and (2) appear in an 
editorial column, those factors point strongly to state constitu-
tional protection. 
Previous judicial interpretation of Article I, section 
15, the history of the promulgation of this provision, Utah com-
mon law authority on fair comment, and Utah's unique and powerful 
history of freedom of the press all support a clear and secure 
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safe harbor for expression of opinion under the Utah Constitu-
tion. The statements at issue in this case should be entitled to 
such state constitutional protection. 
If this Court deems it necessary to reach the federal 
constitutional question, the Op-Ed columns at issue are well 
within the protective shield of Milkovich because the alleged 
implication that appellant misled the public is not susceptible 
to objective proof and therefore cannot be proved true or false. 
Accordingly, Judge Eves' entry of summary judgment in favor of 
the petitioners should have been affirmed in the court below. 
The Court of Appeals' unprecedented suggestion that 
prepublication legal review of newspaper copy may be evidence of 
New York Times v. Sullivan "actual malice" turns First Amendment 
protection in the defamation area upside-down. If anything, 
prepublication legal review should evidence the lack of actual 
malice, as several courts have indicated. The Court of Appeals' 
treatment of this issue would produce less responsible journalism 
and undermine the policy underlying the attorney-client 
privilege. 
The Court of Appeals' further suggestion that the news-
paper's publication of respondent's rebuttal letter to the editor 
along with one of the editorial columns at issue may be evidence 
of actual malice is, again, backward analysis. The decision to 
publish respondent's letter reflected petitioners' confidence in 
the accompanying editorial column and showed an attempt to be 
-7-
balanced and fair. Again, if anything, this fact should evidence 
lack of actual malice, not create a jury issue. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals1 remarkable holding that 
a statement alleging that respondent had attempted to manipulate 
the press is capable of defamatory meaning ignores the context in 
which the statement was made and would, if upheld, impoverish 
political dialogue in Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
This case is about freedom of the press to report and 
comment on politics. The free expression "constitutional guar-
antee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to 
the conduct of campaigns for public office." Monitor Patriot Co. 
v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971). Justice Brandeis wrote 
that "freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are 
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political 
truth." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927). If the 
Court of Appeals decision in this case were the final word, it 
would produce a chilling shrinkage of the marketplace of ideas 
and deviate from established constitutional norms. Press cover-
age of politics and constitutional freedoms would suffer. 
The Court of Appeals decision is divided into three 
sections entitled "Opinion Privilege," "Actual Malice," and 
"Manipulation of the Press." Each section is flawed. This brief 
will point to a few of the more serious errors. 
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Most of this brief will concentrate on the opinion 
issue, but SPJ considers it incumbent to address the serious 
defects in the Court of Appeals' analysis of the actual malice 
and defamatory meaning issues as well. 
I. FLAWS IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION PRIVILEGE 
ANALYSIS 
A. The Court of Appeals Erroneously Failed to Address 
Whether Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution 
Protects the Statements at Issue. 
The Court of Appeals refused to consider whether The 
Daily Spectrum editorial column statements regarding Mr. West's 
position on municipal power are protected under Article I, sec-
tion 15 of the Utah Constitution, which provides that "No law 
shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or 
of the press." The court below said this issue had not been 
raised in the trial court. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 835 P.2d 
179, 184 n.5 (Utah App. 1992) ("West"). 
The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of fact and law. 
The protection of Article I, section 15 was in fact raised in the 
second affirmative defense in petitioners' answer to the com-
plaint, and petitioners' counsel argued that the Utah Constitu-
tion protects the statements in question at the summary judgment 
hearing in the trial court. Moreover, the opinion privilege 
question in general has been a centerpiece of this lawsuit. 
The Court of Appeals further ignored dispositive 
authority in Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988): "Our 
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long-standing rule is that this Court may affirm a judgment of a 
lower court on a ground other than that relied on by that court." 
Id. at 561 (citations omitted). The trial court in Cox had dis-
missed the plaintiffs' defamation claim on First Amendment 
grounds. On appeal, this Court held that "the First Amendment 
[did] not bar the defamation action," but nonetheless affirmed 
the dismissal because the complaint failed to state a defamation 
claim under Utah law. Id. at 561-62. 
In this defamation case, the trial court granted sum-
mary judgment on the opinion privilege issue based on the First 
Amendment. If, as in Cox, the First Amendment does not bar this 
action, affirmance of the trial court would nonetheless be 
appropriate, as in Cox, if the statements at issue are otherwise 
protected as opinion under Utah law — in this case, the Utah 
Constitution. Indeed, even if the First Amendment does bar this 
action, the state constitutional issue is appropriately addressed 
because, as noted above, the opinion privilege was placed in 
question from the outset of this case and because, as noted 
below, the state constitutional analysis appropriately precedes 
2 federal constitutional consideration. 
2The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals, 835 P.2d at 184 n.5, to avoid 
the state constitutional question involved criminal defendants seeking to 
reverse their convictions with state constitutional arguments raised "for the 
first time on appeal," State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990). By con-
trast, in addition to the fact that in this case the state constitutional 
issue was raised in the trial court, the state constitutional argument was 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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B. Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution Protects 
the Statements at Issue, 
1. Nature of the Alleged Defamatory Statement 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
pressed in the Court of Appeals for affirmance, which is consistent with this 
Court's "long standing rule" that an appellate court may affirm a judgment of 
a lower court "on a ground other than that relied on by the Court." Cox v. 
Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). 
In Bobo, the court declined to address a state constitutional search 
issue primarily because the defendant's brief, unlike the briefs in this case, 
contained "little more than 'nominal allusion' to state constitutional 
rights." Id. at 1272 (quoting State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah App. 
1989). 
In State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65 (Utah App. 1990), the court refused to 
consider a search and seizure argument based on a statutory challenge to exe-
cution of arrest warrants. Because this issue had not been raised to support 
a motion to suppress, the appellate court had no trial court ruling on whether 
the statutes were violated and no findings of fact to decide the statutory 
issue. No such problems affect consideration of the state constitutional 
issue here. The Webb court declared that "Utah appellate courts . . . gener-
ally will not consider an issue, even a constitutional one, which the appel-
lant raised on appeal for the first time." Ld. at 77 (citations omitted). As 
noted above, the state constitutional issue was raised at the outset of this 
case and the opinion privilege in general has been a central issue. 
Bobo and Webb both involved new arguments on appeal to exclude evidence, 
arguments that should have been made in a pretrial motion to suppress and 
arguably were waived under Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
"Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make 
requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court 
shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant 
relief from such waiver." 
State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991), involved defendant's 
attempt "for the first time on appeal" to challenge on state constitutional 
grounds the statute underlying his conviction. Again, unlike Archambeau, 
state constitutional protection for expression of opinion was raised in this 
case in the trial court. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
-11-
The Daily Spectrum Op-Ed columns s t a t e d that respon-
d e n t ' s p o s i t i o n on municipal power changed a f t e r the 1987 e l e c -
t i o n . That statement on i t s face i s not defamatory. The Op-Ed 
columns' connotation i s what t roubles respondent. He complains 
that the Spectrum e d i t o r i a l p i e c e s suggest he misled h i s c o n s t i t -
uents on the i s s u e of municipal power. 
Accordingly, t h i s i s a defamation-by-implicat ion case . 
See Robert D. Sack, L ibe l , Slander, and Related Problems 50-51 
(1980) . Without conceding that respondent's suggested impl ica-
t i o n i s reasonable or defamatory, any such impl icat ion from the 
Op-Ed columns i s nonethe less opinion, not provable as true or 
f a l s e , and not ac t ionable as a matter of common law, s t a t e con-
s t i t u t i o n a l law, and federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
F ina l ly , an appel late court may derive "great benef i t" from the t r i a l 
court ' s views on an i s s u e , Zions F i r s t Nat'1 Bank v. Nat'1 American T i t l e 
Insurance Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988), but the absence of those views 
i s not reason alone to refuse appel late considerat ion of an i s s u e . In f a c t , 
t h i s Court does have the bene f i t of Judge Eves' summary judgment analys i s of 
the opinion p r i v i l e g e . 
^Po l i t i c i ans and public o f f i c i a l s often modify the i r p o s i t i o n s on matters of 
publ ic concern. George Bush's re trea t from h i s 1988 "read my l i p s , no new 
taxes" pledge i s a prominent example. Indeed, the phenomenon of p o l i t i c a l 
leaders adapting the i r p o s i t i o n s during p o l i t i c a l campaigns or during serv ice 
in o f f i c e can f a c i l i t a t e the i r doing what i s r ight as opposed to what i s 
p o l i t i c a l l y expedient. Commenting on a p o l i t i c a l o f f i c i a l ' s change in pos i -
t i o n , including respondent's apparent changed p o s i t i o n on municipal power, 
p l a i n l y cannot and should not be defamatory. 
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2. The Primacy Approach to State Constitutional 
Analysis 
Justice Durham described in a bar journal article vari-
ous analytical models for state constitutional analysis. See 
Christine M. Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution in the Utah 
Courts, 2 Utah Bar J. 25, 26 (Nov. 1989). Under the "primacy" 
approach, a state court "looks first to state constitutional law, 
develops independent doctrine and precedent, and decides federal 
questions only when state law is not dispositive." Id. Justice 
Hans Linde and the Oregon Supreme court have favored this 
4 
method. As Justice Durham noted in her 1989 article, at that 
time Utah had not adopted a particular model for state constitu-
tional analysis. Id. at 27. 
This Court recently decided a case in a manner consis-
tent with the primacy approach. In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
^The proper sequence is to analyze the state's law, including its 
constitutional law, before reaching a federal constitutional 
claim. This is required, not for the sake either of parochialism 
or of style, but because the state does not deny any right claimed 
under the federal Constitution when the claim before the court in 
fact is fully met by state law. 
Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (1981). Justice Linde 
elaborated on the analytical structure: 
The right question is what the state' s guarantee means and how it 
applies to the case at hand. The answer may turn out the same as 
it would under federal law. The state's law may prove to be more 
protective than federal law. The state law also may be less pro-
tective. In that case the court must go on to decide the claim 
under federal law, assuming it has been raised. 
Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus -- Constitutional Theory and State Courts. 18 Ga. L. 
Rev. 165, 179 (1984). 
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774 (Utah 1991), appellant claimed that introduction of eyewit-
ness identification evidence violated his right to due process 
under the Utah and federal constitutions. Justice Zimmerman, 
writing for the Court, first analyzed the issue under Article I, 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 782-84. Having found 
no state due process violation and concluding that state consti-
tutional protection is "certainly as stringent as, if not more 
stringent than, the federal analysis," Justice Zimmerman found no 
reason to perform a separate federal constitutional analysis. 
Id. at 784. 
We think this case involving the Daily Spectrum is 
especially well suited for the primacy approach. Thus, state 
constitutional protection for the statements at issue should be 
addressed first. Only if Utah constitutional interpretation is 
inadequate to decide the case should the federal constitutional 
issue be reached. 
3. Background on Legal Protection of Fair Comment and 
Opinion 
a. Fair Comment 
Protection of opinion, even if defamatory, has a strong 
common law foundation. The fair comment privilege entered 
English law in Carr v. Hood, 1 Camp. 355, 170 Eng. Rep. 983 
(1808). American law generally recognized this privilege, see 
Note, Fair Comment, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1207 (1949), and applied it 
to permit criticism and argument about the conduct of public 
.14. 
officials and political candidates, see Marc A. Franklin & David 
A. Anderson, Mass Media Law 254-58 (1990). Over time, the privi-
lege embraced opinions about matters of public concern based on 
true facts, whether the opinion was "reasonable" or not. Rodney 
A. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 6.03[1] at 6-6 (1992) (footnote 
omitted). 
The Utah Code identifies five types of communication 
that are privileged from defamation liability. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 45-2-3 (1988). One of the statutory privileges, the "public 
benefit" privilege, is arguably related the fair comment concept. 
This privilege applies to: 
[A] fair and true report, without malice, of the pro-
ceedings of a public meeting, if such meeting was law-
fully convened for a lawful purpose and open to the 
public, or the publication or broadcast of the matter 
complained of was for the public benefit. 
Id. at § 45-2-3(5). The strictures of this provision render it 
narrower than the traditional fair comment common law privilege. 
However, this Court, in the course of discussing the statutory 
public benefit privilege, has indicated that there is a 
nonstatutory fair comment or "public interest" privilege as part 
of Utah common law, see Seeqmiller v. KSL, Inc. , 626 P.2d 968, 
977-79 (Utah 1981), and that conclusion was reaffirmed recently 
in Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc. , 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 
17-18, 18 n.19 (1992). 
The Seeqmiller court referred to Ocrden Bus Lines v. 
KSL, Inc., 551 P.2d 222 (Utah 1976), which relied on the 
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p r i v i l e g e of f a i r comment on matters of publ ic i n t e r e s t and con-
cern t o s h i e l d the press defendant from a defamation ac t ion by 
Ogden Bus Lines and i t s bus dr iver , who had been involved in an 
accident whi le transport ing school ch i ldren . The s u i t complained 
that an e d i t o r i a l broadcast reported that the dr iver had been 
charged with dr iv ing on a revoked l i c e n s e . The court s t a t e d , "It 
seems c l e a r . . . tha t problems a f f e c t i n g our schoo l s are matters 
in which the publ ic has a l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t , " and concluded 
that the broadcast was within the f a i r comment r u l e . Id. a t 224. 
The Court s ta t ed t h i s p r i v i l e g e had been adopted in Williams v . 
Standard-Examiner Publishing Co., 83 Utah 31, 27 P.2d 1 (1933), 
and Speilberq v. A. Kuhn & Bro. , 39 Utah 276, 116 P. 1027 
( 1 9 1 1 ) . 5 
The Seeqmiller court sa id tha t the f a i r comment or 
"public i n t e r e s t " pro tec t ion 
i s app l i cab le , a t l e a s t , when the publ ic hea l th and 
s a f e t y are involved and when there i s a l e g i t i m a t e 
i s s u e with respect t o the funct ioning of governmental 
bodies , o f f i c i a l s , or publ ic i n s t i t u t i o n s , or with 
respect t o matters involv ing the expenditure of publ ic 
funds. 
626 P.2d at 978 (emphasis added). However, as the Seecrmiller and 
Williams d e c i s i o n s recognized, the f a i r comment p r i v i l e g e i s a 
^In Williams, p l a i n t i f f Ogden c i t y commissioner sued about newspaper columns 
accusing him of criminal negl igence for permitting p o l l u t i o n of the c i t y water 
system and thereby causing a typhoid epidemic. The Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that the published accounts were pr iv i l eged as a matter of common i n t e r e s t . 
This Court explained that the newspaper "was performing a duty which f a l l s 
within that c l a s s mentioned in the rule as ' o f a moral or s o c i a l character of 
imperfect o b l i g a t i o n . ' " 27 P.2d at 14 ( c i t a t i o n omitted) . 
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conditional or qualified privilege, which can be overcome with a 
showing of common law malice. See Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, 
Inc., 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 18 (1992). 
The Utah common law privilege for fair comment on mat-
ters of public interest discussed in Qgden Bus Lines and 
Seecrmiller should protect an opinion column commenting upon a 
public official's position on a matter of public controversy, 
such as municipal power. If not dispositive on this issue in 
this case, this common law authority should at least inform the 
Court's consideration of the state constitutional law question. 
b. Opinion 
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), 
the United States Supreme Court declared: 
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a 
false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we 
depend for its correction not on the conscience of 
judges and juries but on the competition of other 
ideas. 
Id. at 339-40. For sixteen years, state courts and lower federal 
courts read this dictum as establishing a constitutional privi-
lege rendering as unconstitutional actions for defamation based 
on statements of opinion. Until the Milkovich decision, which is 
discussed below, there was substantial support for the view that 
broader First Amendment protection for opinion had taken over the 
common law fair comment privilege. See Smolla, supra, § 
6.02[4][b] at 6-12. The judicial challenge was to develop a 
meaningful analysis to distinguish fact from opinion. 
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The leading case until Milkovich was Oilman v. Evans. 
750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert, denied, 741 U.S. 
1127 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Oilman, the D.C. 
Circuit formulated a four-part test to determine whether a First 
Amendment privilege for opinion was applicable: (1) the common 
usage or meaning of the specific language; (2) the verifiability 
of the statement; (3) the full context of the statement — the 
entire article or column, for example; and (4) the broader con-
text of the setting in which the statement appears. Courts after 
Oilman widely adopted this analysis to distinguish fact from 
opinion. E.g. . Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc. , 788 F.2d 1300 (8th 
Cir.) (en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986). 
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S.Ct. 2698 
(1990), Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, concluded 
that lower courts had been mistaken in thinking there is a 
free-standing First Amendment privilege for opinion. Instead, he 
wrote, the proper analysis asks whether a statement on a matter 
of public concern can be proven false. Id. at 2706. He relied 
on Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), 
in which the Court fashioned "a constitutional requirement that 
the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as 
fault, before recovering damages." Id. at 776. 
^In Hepps the Court held that the First Amendment allocates the burden of 
proving falsity on the plaintiff in a case where a private figure is suing for 
defamation about a statement of public concern. Then Justice Rehnquist joined 
Justice Stevens' dissent. 
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Accordingly, Milkovich in essence exchanged the old 
dichotomy between "fact and opinion" represented in cases like 
Oilman for a new distinction between "fact and non-fact." See 
Smolla, supra, § 6.03[7][d] at 6-16.12. It thus preserved con-
stitutional immunity for genuine opinion while recasting the ana-
lytical terminology. 
The Milkovich Court, however, seemed to resist an anal-
ysis that accounts for the full context of the statement at 
issue. Instead, to determine whether a statement is provable as 
false, it focused on the commonly understood meaning of the 
actual words and their verifiability as well as whether the type 
of speech is rhetorical hyperbole or vigorous epithets. The 
Court did not emphasize the Oilman factors of the full context of 
the statement and the setting in which the statement appears. By 
failing to do so, Milkovich left journalists in Utah and else-
where in a state of uncertainty about the scope of protection for 
commentary on matters of public controversy. 
For the journalist or editor facing deadline pressure 
on controversial reporting, uncertainty leads to self-censorship, 
and self-censorship leads to diminution of public debate. 
Indeed, that is why the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan 
stressed the need for "breathing space" for freedom of expres-
sion. 376 U.S. at 271-72. Questions about the proper applica-
tion of Milkovich need answers from the federal judiciary, but 
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this Court can supply the clear and secure protection for opinion 
needed in this State through the Utah Constitution. 
4. Article I, Section 15 Should Be Interpreted to 
Provide a State Opinion Privilege that Protects 
the Statements at Issue in this Case. 
This case presents an appropriate opportunity to secure 
and clarify free expression rights under the Utah Constitution. 
The interpretive step we propose is a modest one that is fully 
consistent with the state constitutional language and history, 
Utah common law authority, and a strong historical commitment in 
Utah to free speech and free press values. 
a. The State Constitutional Language and Judi-
cial Interpretation. 
Article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal 
prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evi-
dence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury 
that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was 
published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have 
the right to determine the law and the fact. 
This provision differs from the First Amendment in that 
the latter proscribes laws "abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press," while the Utah Constitution forbids laws that 
"abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press." 
(Emphasis added.) Although the full interpretive significance of 
this difference is not apparent, the additional language in the 
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Utah provision is some evidence that protection of free expres-
sion in Utah need not march lockstep with the federal 
constitution.7 In light of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, 
section 2 of the United States Constitution, if the scope of pro-
tection for expression differs under the state and federal con-
stitutions, the Utah Constitution must provide greater protection 
g 
for freedom of speech and of the press than the F i r s t Amendment. 
Utah appe l la te courts have interpreted A r t i c l e I # 
s e c t i o n 15 in surpr i s ing ly few c a s e s . However, in cases when the 
free express ion provis ion of the Utah Const i tut ion has been 
addressed, the Utah Supreme Court has not been h e s i t a n t t o 
in terpre t and apply t h i s provis ion independently of the F i r s t 
9 Amendment t o the United Sta tes Const i tut ion . 
For example, in Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 
515 (Utah 1984), t h i s Court found a r i g h t of publ ic access t o 
preliminary hearings in Utah criminal cases based on A r t i c l e I , 
s e c t i o n 15. The court explained that although i t s "decis ion on 
^Professor Sager argues that because s t a t e courts are distanced from the 
''homogenized national v i s i o n from which the Supreme Court i s forced to oper-
a t e , " but instead act against a backdrop of divergent s t a t e h i s t o r i e s and 
p r a c t i c e s , i t i s permissible for them to arrive at d i f f erent "strategic" 
interpretat ions of like-worded provis ions . See Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: 
State Courts and the Strateg ic Space Between Norms and Rules of Consti tut ional 
Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 959, 976 (1985). 
8See Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 10 n.9 (1992). 
^In 1977 Jus t i ce Brennan published the seminal a r t i c l e advocating such 
inquiry. See William J. Brennan, J r . , State Consti tut ions and the Protect ion 
of Individual Rights. 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). 
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the First Amendment is sufficient to dispose of this case, it is 
also appropriate for us to resolve the issue under the Utah Con-
stitution as an independent and alternative ground. On that 
ground, our decision is final and unreviewable." Id. at 520 
(citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)). 
In KUTV v. Wilkinson, 686 P.2d 456 (Utah 1984), this 
Court relied on Article I, section 15 to fashion a test for 
restraining press reporting during a criminal trial that added a 
public interest factor to the criteria that the United States 
Supreme Court articulated under the First Amendment in Nebraska 
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
Particularly instructive is KUTV v. Conder, 668 P.2d 
513 (Utah 1983), because the Utah Supreme Court examined the his-
tory of Article I, section 15 in the course of invalidating a 
trial court prior restraint on the press that enjoined reporting 
on information about a criminal defendant during his criminal 
trial. Justice Oaks, writing for the Court, concluded that the 
Utah free expression provision "is at least as protective of 
these rights as the First Amendment. That is as far as we need 
to go for the decision in this case." 668 P.2d at 521 (emphasis 
added) . We are asking this Court to go a bit further, and the 
historical analysis in Conder points the way. 
Justice Oaks reviewed the history of the Utah Constitu-
tional Convention and found it to be "sparse" as to Article I, 
section 15. Id. at 518. However, he wrote that "Delegate Heber 
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M. Wells , speaking for the committee, did inform the convention 
that ' t h i s s e c t i o n [ 1 5 ] , j u s t as i t stands here, i s the same as 
in New York, Cal i fornia , Michigan, Wisconsin, South Carolina, and 
Maine, and there are s imi lar prov is ions in a great many of the 
s t a t e s . ' " Id. (quoting 1 O f f i c i a l Report of the Proceedings and 
Debates of the Convention 322 (1898) ) . J u s t i c e Oaks proceeded 
t o review court d e c i s i o n s from some of those s t a t e s . 
New York was one of the s t a t e s mentioned in Conder and 
at the Utah Const i tut ional Convention. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the h igh-
e s t court of New York, the Court of Appeals, decided in 1991 that 
the New York Const i tut ion provides protec t ion for expression of 
opinion against defamation l i a b i l i t y t o a broader extent than 
Milkovich. Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 78 N.Y. 2d 184, 567 
N.E.2d 1270, c e r t , denied. 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991). The court 
In jus t i ce Oaks pointed out that t h i s l i s t i n g of s t a t e s was not "ent ire ly accu-
r a t e , " c i t i n g the Maine and South Carolina provis ions as being d i s s imi lar to 
Utah's . 668 P.2d at 519 n .2 . Professor Flynn explained that "the convention 
borrowed heavi ly from e a r l i e r Utah cons t i tu t ions and other s t a t e cons t i tu -
t i o n s , par t i cu lar ly those of Nevada, Washington, I l l i n o i s , and New York . . . 
." John J. Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government -- The History of 
Utah's Const i tut ion, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 311, 324. 
^ A r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 8 of the New York Consti tut ion provides: 
Every c i t i z e n may f ree ly speak, write and publish h i s s e n t i -
ments on a l l subjec t s , being responsible for the abuse of that 
r ight ; and no law s h a l l be passed to re s t ra in or abridge the l i b -
erty of speech or of the press . In a l l criminal prosecutions or 
indictments for l i b e l s , the truth may be given in evidence to the 
jury; and i f i t s h a l l appear to the jury that the matter charged 
as l ibe lous i s true, and was published with good motives and for 
j u s t i f i a b l e ends, the party sha l l be acquitted; and the jury sha l l 
have the r ight to determine the law and the f a c t . 
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stressed the importance of examining the f u l l context of the 
challenged speech: reading the statement as a whole and consid-
ering the broader context of the set t ing of the statement. 567 
N.E.2d at 1280-82. For example, i t was s ignif icant that the 
statement at issue appeared in a l e t t er to the editor, which i s 
typical ly a vehicle for expression of opinion. Id. at 1280-81. 
The court further jus t i f i ed i t s broader protection of opinion 
because of the "responsibil ity to s e t t l e the law of t h i s State." 
12 Id. at 1278. As one noted commentator recently put i t , "the 
New York Court of Appeals demonstrated the independence that 
s tate courts retain after Milkovich to craft their own broader 
approaches to the fact/opinion d i s t inct ion ." Smolla, supra, at § 
6.03[8][a] at 6- 16 .18 . 1 3 
12Cf. State v . Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990) ( p l u r a l i t y ) ("The time 
has come for t h i s court, in applying an automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement of a r t i c l e I , s e c t i o n 14 of the Utah Const i tut ion, to try to sim-
p l i f y , i f p o s s i b l e , the search and se izure rules so that they can be more eas-
i l y followed by the p o l i c e and the courts . . . . " ) 
l^The Court of Appeals of New York recent ly reaffirmed i t s p o s i t i o n in Immuno 
A.G. that protec t ion for opinion i s broader under the New York Const i tut ion 
than under the United States Const i tut ion. 600 West 115th Street Corp. v. 
Gutfeld, No. 166, 1992 N.Y. LEXIS 3424 (N.Y. Oct. 20, 1992). The court 
referred to i t s opinion doctrine methodology under Immuno as ''a State contex-
tual a n a l y s i s . " Id. at *27. The court held that defendant's statements at a 
publ ic hearing in opposi t ion to p l a i n t i f f ' s appl icat ion for a bui ld ing permit 
declaring that p l a i n t i f f had "denigrated" the bui ld ing involved, had operated 
under an " i l l e g a l l e a s e , " and had made a proposal that was "fraudulent" and 
"smell[ed] of bribery and corruption" were protected opinions under the fed-
era l and s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n s . 
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Two additional features of this decision should aid the 
analysis in this case: emphasis on common law interpretation and 
a state history of press freedom. 
b. Utah Common Law as a Guide 
The Immuno A.G. court pointed to New York common law as 
informing its state constitutional analysis. 567 N.E.2d at 1278. 
This Court can do the same, even though few Utah cases address 
the issue of fair comment privilege for expression of opinion. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in the Qgden Bus Lines case, 
supra, reflects strong judicial solicitude for protection of 
expression on matters of public interest. In recognizing a priv-
ilege for the statements at issue in that case, this Court 
stated: "It seems clear . . . that problems affecting our 
schools are matters in which the public has a legitimate inter-
est." 551 P.2d at 224. 
In the Seegmiller case, supra, which concerned a news 
report alleging that plaintiff, a private individual, had starved 
his horse, this Court found that the privilege did not apply 
because there was no claim in the news report about the actions 
of government officials and no claim that the incident "was a 
problem having widespread dimensions beyond the single instance 
in this case." 626 P.2d at 979. By contrast, where, as here, 
there is commentary on an elected official about a matter of pub-
lic policy having significant ramifications, the Qgden Bus Lines 
authority appears controlling. These two cases, like the common 
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law tradition supporting the Immuno A.G. analysis, supply inter-
pretive guidance to resolve the state constitutional question in 
favor of the petitioners in this case. 
c. Utah History of Press Freedom 
Finally, the Immuno A.G. court pointed to New York's 
"own exceptional history and rich tradition" in the area of "lib-
erty of the press." 567 N.E.2d at 1278. Perhaps no state's his-
tory is more exceptional in this regard than the State of Utah's, 
especially the period leading up to the promulgation and adoption 
of the free speech and press provision of the Utah Constitution, 
for that time witnessed a caustic journalistic frenzy over the 
role of the LDS Church in political and economic affairs and over 
14 the practice of polygamy. 
The first issue of Utah's first newspaper, the Deseret 
News, was published on June 15, 1850. Over the next fifty years 
approximately 585 separate newspapers were published in Utah with 
more than 1,200 editors and publishers, reflecting a wide expanse 
of viewpoint. J. Cecil Alter, Early Utah Journalism 13-14 
(1938). Summarizing his exhaustive study of nineteenth century 
Utah newspapers, Mr. Alter wrote that "[t]he pioneer editor usu-
ally considered himself a weakling if he did not stand positively 
14This b ackground should take on added significance because the principal pro-
visions on individual rights in the Utah Constitution, including the free 
expression provision, ''were not subjects of dispute" at the Utah Constitu-
tional Convention. Martin B. Hickman, Utah Constitutional Law 72 (1954) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah). 
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and aggress ive ly for or against something, monitoring the 
thoughts and ac t ions of the community with the d ign i ty and sever-
i t y of a D ic ta tor ." Id. at 9. He concluded that *[n]o newspa-
pers of any s e c t i o n of the country, or of any period in the 
Nat ion's h i s t o r y , were ever more eagerly awaited or more c l o s e l y 
read than those h a i l i n g from Utah through the anti-polygamy cru-
15 
sade of the l a s t hal f of the Nineteenth Century." Id. 
Emblematic of Utah's unique h i s t o r y of press freedom 
are the ear ly years of The Sa l t Lake Tribune, which, as i t s h i s -
tor ian notes , "was born in to a f ront i er world of inflamed 
conf l ict—economic, p o l i t i c a l , e c c l e s i a s t i c a l and s o c i a l . " 0. N. 
Malmquist, The F i r s t 100 Years—A History of The Sa l t Lake Tr i -
bune 1871-1971 at 6 (1971). Founded by excommunicated LDS con-
v e r t s in 1870 under the banner Mormon Tribune, the i n i t i a l goal 
of serving as a v e h i c l e for accommodation among a l l elements in 
the community gave way t o pungent d i s s e n t inflamed by "those who 
were unwi l l ing t o s e t t l e for anything l e s s than extermination of 
the Mormon Church as an economic and p o l i t i c a l power and those 
" I n h i s report on the early years of the Salt Lake Tribune, Mr. Alter noted 
the fol lowing e d i t o r i a l headlines about the LDS Church through 1874: "An 
Indiscreet Liar (Herald); Is Brigham Young Insane; Non-Intercourse With Mor-
mons; The Truth Is Not In Them; Brigham Commands Non-Intercourse With Gen-
t i l e s ; Backed Down At Last; The Prophet On His Haunches; Brigham Young Backing 
Down On Enoch; The Gentile Revelation; Enoch in Provo; Herald Aghast; Unsound 
Teaching; Marriage In Utah; Convincing Them Of Their Error; Bamboozling The 
Heathen; The Lord's Bookkeeper; A L i t t l e Of The Creed; The Curse Of Utah, e t 
cetera , e t ce tera ." Al ter , supra, at 356. 
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seeking abolition and retroactive punishment of polygamy." Id. 
at 7. Mr. Malmquist explained: 
It was a high road that the founders laid out for 
themselves. They soon discovered that it was an 
incredibly rocky road as well; that the base of support 
for a journal avoiding disparagement of personalities 
and ignoring religious distinctions was small indeed. 
They learned the hard way that the irrepressible pres-
sures of the times were in the direction of a gloves-
off fight on ecclesiastical as well as economic, polit-
ical and social issues; that while there were moderate 
gentiles and Mormons of the same mind as themselves, 
they were not numerous enough to make such a newspaper 
as they had pledged to publish economically viable. 
Id. at 18-19. 
By 1873, The Sa l t Lake Tribune decided t o "pull off the 
e d i t o r i a l g loves and s t a r t endearing themselves t o the anti-Mor-
mons . . . ." Id. a t 38. For the next decade, " o b j e c t i v i t y was 
a v i c e not t o be t o l e r a t e d in news columns, e d i t o r i a l s or corre -
spondence from readers . The news columns and correspondence were 
frequently more opinionated than the e d i t o r i a l s , p o s s i b l y because 
the reporters and correspondents were more opinionated than the 
e d i t o r i a l w r i t e r s . " ^d. at 41 . Mr. Malmquist chron ic l e s the 
-^Perhaps some measure of the j o u r n a l i s t i c invect ive of the time can be 
gleaned from a Deseret News e d i t o r i a l describing the Tribune as 
the manufacturers of anti-Mormon sensat ions; the scavengers of the 
press ; the s landerers of the l i v i n g and defamers of the dead; the 
garblers of public speeches; the blasphemers of sacred things; the 
cowardly l i b e l e r s of women and chi ldren; the dirty-minded scandal 
mongers; the craven dastards who f l i n g the i r f i l t h at those they 
know w i l l not r e t a l i a t e ; the pen-stabbers; the character assas -
s i n s ; the authors of f a l s e te legraphic dispatches; and the i r 
aiders and abe t t er s - -are the characters referred t o . 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Tribune's continued anti-polygamy crusade and i t s intense 
no-holds-barred competit ion with the Deseret News and the Sa l t 
Lake HeraId. Id. a t 54-150. In h i s h i s t o r y of the Deseret News, 
Wendell Ashton described t h i s competit ion as "a newspaper b a t t l e 
that resounded across the nat ion ." He explained that the News 
was "drawn in to the fray, which was t o l a s t for decades." 
Wendell J. Ashton, Voice in the West 170 ( 1 9 5 0 ) . 1 7 
I t was against t h i s backdrop of free-wheel ing journal-
i s t i c fervor that the Const i tut ional Convention met in 1895 and 
promulgated A r t i c l e I , s e c t i o n 15 of the Utah Const i tut ion . This 
provis ion should be interpreted with Utah's r i ch t r a d i t i o n of 
press freedom and unrestrained e d i t o r i a l i z i n g in mind. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
Malmquist, supra at 43 (quoting the Deseret News. March 31, 1880). In i t s 
report of the death of Brigham Young, the Tribune reported: 
[H]e was i l l i t e r a t e and has made a frequent boast that he never 
saw the ins ide of a school house. His habit of mind was singu-
l a r l y i l l o g i c a l and h i s public addresses are the greates t farrago 
of nonsense that ever was put in pr int . He prided himself on 
being a great f inancier , and yet a l l h i s commercial speculat ions 
have been conspicuous f a i l u r e s . He was a flarophant, and pre-
tended to be in da i ly intercourse with the Almighty, and yet he 
was grovel ing in h i s ideas , and the system of r e l i g i o n he formu-
la ted was wel l nigh Satanic . . . . [W]e b e l i e v e that the most 
graceful act of h i s l i f e has been h i s death . . . . 
Id . at 46 (quoting The Sal t Lake Tribune, August 30, 1877). 
Ashton described the Tribune during t h i s period as "v io lent ly and vul-
garly anti-Mormon." Ashton, supra at 173. 
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d. Proposed State Constitutional Analysis 
We urge a totality of circumstances approach to deter-
mine whether statements are privileged opinion under state con-
stitutional law and suggest this case as a compelling opportunity 
18 to recognize independent state constitutional protection. Two 
features of the newspaper columns at issue here point to the 
proper development of a state constitutional privilege for 
expression of opinion. First, the columns were about an elected 
political official concerning a matter of public controversy. 
The columns therefore are squarely in the political arena. Sec-
ond , the statements appeared in editorial opinion columns, a 
forum that has a long and venerable history as the home of polit-
ical opinion. We urge this Court to conclude that statements 
about political figures in contexts that are traditionally the 
source of political opinion are presumptively protected as opin-
ion under Article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution. 
1. The Political Arena Factor 
Speech in the political arena has been singled out for 
special constitutional protection. The United States Supreme 
Court said in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), 
that the First Amendment gives constitutional shelter to 
l^The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine recently declared that "[o]ur standard 
looks to the totality of the circumstances" in deciding whether a statement 
expresses "fact" or "opinion." Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65, 71 (Me. 1991). 
The court then indicated that this approach is consistent with Milkovich. 
Immuno A.G. , and Oilman. Id. at 71 n.9. The court seemed to tie this stan-
dard to "Maine's common law of defamation." Id. at 71. 
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"vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials." Id. at 270. The free speech 
"constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent appli-
cation precisely to the conduct of campaigns for public office." 
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971).19 
Interpreting Article I, section 15 in Kearns-Tribune v. Lewis, 
supra, this Court declared that "the freedoms of speech and press 
are fundamental to the effective exercise of the ultimate politi-
cal power of the people." 685 P.2d at 521. Those who enter the 
political kitchen must accept the heat. To borrow from Cardozo, 
"the timorous may stay at home." Murphy v. Steeplechase Amuse-
ment Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173, 174 (1929). 
Courts generally have been more liberal in construing 
as opinion statements made by participants in, and by those who 
comment on, political campaigns. For example, in Misovsky v. 
Oklahoma Publishing Co., 654 P.2d 587 (Okla.), cert, denied, 459 
U.S. 923 (1982), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that a news-
paper's charges of dirty politics on the part of a senatorial 
candidate, who had repeated allegations of another candidate's 
iy
"Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amend-
ment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." Land-
mark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia. 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978). 
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homosexuality and which the latter denied, were protected 
. . 20 
opinion. 
We recommend as i n s t r u c t i v e Judge Robert Bork's concur-
r ing opinion in Oilman v . Evans, supra, a defamation case about 
an Evans and Novak opinion column c r i t i c i z i n g the proposed 
appointment of a Marxist professor t o be Chair of the Univers i ty 
of Maryland P o l i t i c a l Science Department. Judge Bork emphasized 
the p o l i t i c a l nature of the controversy: the p l a i n t i f f , "by h i s 
own a c t i o n s , entered a p o l i t i c a l arena in which heated d iscourse 
was t o be expected and must be protected . . . . [He] placed 
himself in an arena where he should expect t o be j o s t l e d and 
bumped in a way that a pr iva te person need not expect . Where 
p o l i t i c s and ideas about p o l i t i c s contend, there i s a f i r s t 
amendment arena . . . .» 750 F.2d at 1002. "[T]o pro tec t a v i g -
orous marketplace in p o l i t i c a l ideas and content ions , we ought t o 
accept the propos i t ion that those who p lace themselves in a 
p o l i t i c a l arena must accept a degree of derogation that others 
need not ." Id. at 1 0 0 2 . 2 1 
200ne of the a r t i c l e s quoted another party' s descr ipt ion of the p l a i n t i f f as a 
"hatchet man;" another c a l l e d the p l a i n t i f f ' s attack "despicable and s tupid ." 
The paper accused the p l a i n t i f f of having "sunk to a new low in Oklahoma 
p o l i t i c a l rhetor ic- -and for him that takes some doing." 654 P.2d at 593-94. 
2lAs Judge Eves wrote in h i s Memorandum Opinion of July 25, 1990 at 8: 
One who observes the a c t i v i t i e s of an e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l and 
draws conclusions from that observation, then forms opinions from 
those conclusions and s t a t e s them publ i c ly should not be placed in 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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2. The Editorial Column Context Factor 
Decisions run strongly in favor of finding statements 
on the Op-Ed pages to be protected opinions. See Smolla, supra, 
22 
§ 6.12[4] at 6-45 (citing numerous cases). Judge Starr, writ-
ing for the Oilman majority, stressed the context in which the 
column appeared, explaining that "[s]ome types of writing or 
speech by custom or convention signal to readers or listeners 
that what is being read or heard is likely to be opinion, not 
fact." 750 F.2d at 983 (footnote omitted). Judge Starr con-
cluded that "it is well understood that editorial writers and 
commentators frequently ' resort to the type of caustic bombast 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
jeopardy of legal action as it is important that the press and the 
electorate have the freedom to express their ideas and to exchange 
information. 
"it is noteworthy that in the years preceding statehood and adoption of the 
Utah Constitution, The Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret News featured two of 
their most brilliant and provocative editorial writers ever in C.C. Goodwin 
and Charles W. Penrose, respectively. See Malmquist, supra, at 56-62; Ashton, 
supra, at 183-206. ''The verbal thrusts of one sharpened the retaliatory 
instinct of the other. Just as any extraordinary skill is more impressive in 
confrontation with another extraordinary skill than in isolation, the lustre 
of one added lustre to the other." Malmquist, supra, at 57. 
Further evidence of Utah's rich editorial tradition is a study of the 
German language weekly Salt Lake City Beobachter, which, during the early 
1890's, "took the field against the Liberal Party," which was "supported by 
the 'Gentiles' and the Salt Lake Tribune." The Beobachter used "a series of 
letters to the editor from a fictional 'Hans Besenstiel.' Highly exaggerated 
in their satire, extremely earthy in their humor, these letters strike blow 
after satirical blow at the party and its philosophy." Thomas L. Broadbent, 
The Salt Lake City Beobachter: Mirror of an Immigration. 26 Utah Hist. Q. 
329, 333-34 (1958). 
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t r a d i t i o n a l l y used in e d i t o r i a l wr i t ing t o s t imulate publ ic reac -
t i o n . ^ Id. a t 984 (quoting National R i f l e Ass'n v . Dayton News-
papers , I n c . , 555 F. Supp. 1299, 1309 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding 
that the statement in an e d i t o r i a l that the National R i f l e Asso-
c i a t i o n "happily encourages . . . murders and robberies" was pro-
t e c t e d opinion) . See a l s o Loeb v . Globe Newspaper Co. . 489 F. 
Supp. 481 (D. Mass. 1980) ( c r i t i c a l e d i t o r i a l held protected 
opinion; l i k e l y would have been t rea ted as f a c t i f i t had 
23 appeared on front page) . 
Courts have regarded the e d i t o r i a l context as a c r i t i -
ca l fac tor in construing as opinion what in other s e t t i n g s might 
be deemed f a c t . In Kot l ikoff v . Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 444 
A.2d 1086 (1982), a l e t t e r t o the e d i t o r accused a mayor and a 
tax as se s sor with conceal ing the names of del inquent taxpayers , 
suggest ing they might be "engaged in a huge coverup." The 
charges, considered in t h e i r " e d i t o r i a l forum" context , were held 
t o be opinion. As one commentator put i t , "Although the e d i t o -
r i a l format i s c l e a r l y not determinat ive , in ambiguous cases the 
presentat ion of a statement on an e d i t o r i a l or op-ed page should 
increase the l i k e l i h o o d tha t the statement w i l l be perceived as 
23"Certain formats - - e d i t o r i a l s , reviews, p o l i t i c a l cartoons, l e t t e r s to the 
e d i t o r - - s i g n a l the reader to ant i c ipa te a departure from what i s ac tua l ly 
known by the author as f a c t . " Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S.Ct. 
2695, 2713 (1990) (Brennan, J . , d i s sent ing) ( c i t a t i o n omitted) . In Hustler 
Magazine v. Falwel l , 485 U.S. 46 (1988), Chief J u s t i c e Rehnquist, referr ing to 
p o l i t i c a l cartoons, concluded that "our p o l i t i c a l discourse would have been 
considerably poorer without them." Id. at 55. The same point appl ies with 
even greater force to the e d i t o r i a l column. 
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an expression of opinion," Bruce W. Sanford, Libel and Privacy 
191 (2d ed. 1991) (footnote omitted). 
e. The Utah Constitution Protects the Statements 
at Issue, 
The statements at issue in this case appear in a con-
text where readers everywhere expect to find opinion 
commentary—an Op-Ed column. They especially expect to read 
expressions of opinion there about public officials and politics, 
which precisely describes the Daily Spectrum columns. The words 
on their face—describing the respondent's changed position on 
municipal power—are not susceptible of defamatory meaning, and 
respondent's alleged connotation from these words is not capable 
of objective proof. Read as a whole and in full context, the 
statements at issue cannot be the basis for a defamation suit 
because Article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution should 
protect this expression as privileged opinion. 
C. The Court of Appeals Erroneously Applied Milkovich 
v. Lorain Journal Co. to the Statements at Issue. 
As noted above, Milkovich preserved federal constitu-
tional protection for opinion, recasting the analysis in terms of 
protection for statements not capable of being proved true or 
24 false. That is precisely the type of statement at issue in 
determining whether the statement is provable as true or false, courts 
should recognize that First Amendment interests require such proof to be by 
clear and convincing evidence. See Robertson v. McCloskey. 666 F. Supp. 241 
(D.D.C. 1987); Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in Public Person Defamation 
Cases: The Impact of the First Amendment, 66 Texas L. Rev. 217, 239-45 (1987). 
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this case. Therefore, although Milkovich, in our judgment, 
26 
represents a cramped reading of the First Amendment and leaves 
important unanswered questions, the statements at issue in th i s 
case f a l l well within Milkovich's protective mantle. 
The Milkovich Court concluded that lower courts had 
been mistaken in thinking that there i s a free-standing First 
Amendment privi lege for opinion. Instead, the proper analysis 
asks whether a statement on a matter of public concern can be 
proven as fa l s e . Id. at 2706. If i t cannot, then there i s First 
Amendment protection. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
In deciding whether the Daily Spectrum statements in 
th i s case are protected under Milkovich, the Court of Appeals 
f e l l into a l ingu i s t i c trap that produced faulty analysis and 
deprived the pet i t ioners of their f u l l scope of constitutional 
protection. If allowed to stand, th i s truncated interpretation 
of Milkovich r isks unnecessary self-censorship of edi tor ia l opin-
ion writing about p o l i t i c s . 
25The statement in the Op-Ed columns that appellant changed h i s p o s i t i o n on 
municipal power i s not on i t s face capable of defamatory meaning, and he does 
not so contend. Instead, he claims that the Op-Ed columns connote that he 
misled the publ ic . We do not agree that a reasonable reader would draw such 
an inference , but even i f such an impl icat ion i s p o s s i b l e , i t i s not act ion-
able because t h i s impl icat ion cannot be proven true or f a l s e . 
26see T.J. Hager, Note, Lost Breathing Space--Supreme Court S t i f l e s Freedom of 
Expression by Eliminating F ir s t Amendment Opinion P r i v i l e g e . 65 Tul. L. Rev. 
944 (1991). 
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The Court of Appeals failed to recognize a common dis-
tinction in defamation law between statements that on their face 
may be false and defamatory and the statements' implications that 
may be false and defamatory. The central issue in this case is 
whether an implication can be the basis for defamation liability. 
See Sack, supra, at 50-51. The statements on their face said 
that Mr. West changed his position on municipal power after the 
1987 election. As the court below concluded, that statement con-
veys a fact that can be proved true or false. However, it is not 
27 . . . 
defamatory. We have come to expect politicians occasionally to 
28 
change their positions on issues after elections, and the fact 
an elected official has done so is, alone, hardly defamatory. 
What troubles Mr. West is the arguable implication that 
he misled his constituents. That implication, under Milkovich, 
is protected under the First Amendment because it cannot be 
proven true or false. Indeed, in Milkovich itself, the Court 
stressed that "the issue of falsity relates to the defamatory 
facts implied by a statement." 110 S.Ct. at 2706 n.7 (emphasis in 
original). As the Michigan Supreme Court recently stated, "the 
question whether a statement is capable of rendering a defamatory 
implication and whether, in fact, a plaintiff has proved falsity 
^'"[A]n embarrassing, even though false, statement that does not damage one's 
reputation is not actionable as libel or slander." Cox v. Hatch. 761 P.2d 
556, 561 (Utah 1988). 
28E.g., "Read my lips, no new taxes." George Bush (1988). 
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in an impl icat ion are separate i n q u i r i e s . A p l a i n t i f f a l l e g i n g 
defamation by impl icat ion must s t i l l prove material f a l s i t y . " 
Locricchio v . Evening News Assoc ia t ion , 438 Mich. 84, 129, 476 
N.W.2d 112, 132 (1991), c e r t , denied, 112 S.Ct. 1267 (1992) 
29 (emphasis added). 
The f a l l a c y in the Court of Appeals' opinion p r i v i l e g e 
a n a l y s i s i s t h a t , in determining whether any express ion about 
respondent can be proved true or f a l s e , i t erroneously combined 
the nondefamatory fac tua l statements about Mr. West changing h i s 
p o s i t i o n on municipal power with the p o s s i b l e impl icat ion that he 
misled c o n s t i t u e n t s . The Court of Appeals a s ser ted that "the 
connotation" of the e d i t o r i a l columns could "be proven f a l s e by 
proving the underlying fac tua l a s s e r t i o n f a l s e , " West, 835 P.2d 
at 186, but the former hardly fo l lows l o g i c a l l y from the 
30 l a t t e r . Accordingly, the court below misapplied Milkovich. 
2^As Professor Smolla expla ins , opinions can be defamatory--having a tendency 
to injure reputat ion--but nonetheless be nonactionable as protected opinion 
not provable as true or f a l s e . Smolla, supra, at § 6 .09[1] at 6-36-37 (1992). 
Therefore, even i f the statements at i s sue in t h i s case connote that p l a i n t i f f 
misled h i s c o n s t i t u e n t s , and even i f that connotation i s capable of a 
defamatory meaning--both of which are dubious assumptions--the statements are 
not act ionable because they are not defamatory on the i r face and because the 
a l l eged connotation i s protected opinion. 
^^The error in the Court of Appeals' ana lys i s i s demonstrated by a comment in 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977): 
I f the defendant bases h i s expression of a derogatory opinion of 
the p l a i n t i f f on h i s own statement of f a l s e and defamatory f a c t s , 
he i s subject to l i a b i l i t y for the factual statement but not for 
the expression of opinion. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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In applying Milkovich, courts should seek guidance from 
severa l cases Chief J u s t i c e Rehnquist c i t e d with approval. The 
Milkovich Court considered as good law the holdings in Greenbelt 
Cooperative Publishing Ass 'n , Inc. v . Bres ler , 398 U.S. 6 (1970), 
that a newspaper was p r i v i l e g e d in report ing comments at a c i t y 
counci l meeting that characterized a deve loper ' s negot ia t ing 
p o s i t i o n as "blackmail," and in Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 
U.S. 264 (1974), that no one could reasonably understand the pub-
l i c a t i o n of Jack London's famous d e f i n i t i o n of a "scab" as a 
" tra i tor t o h i s God, h i s country, h i s family and h i s c l a s s , " to 
be a charge of the crime of treason. The words were being used 
"in a loose f i g u r a t i v e sense . . . merely r h e t o r i c a l hyperbole, a 
l u s t y and imaginative express ion of the contempt f e l t by union 
members t o those who refuse t o j o i n them." Id. a t 284-86. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
Id. § 566, comment c ( l ) . In th i s case, the factual statement i s not 
defamatory and therefore not actionable, and any arguable implication from the 
statement of fact is not provable as true or false and therefore also i s not 
actionable. The next par t of the Restatement reinforces th i s point: 
If the defendant bases his expression of a derogatory opinion of 
the p l a in t i f f on his own statement of facts that are not 
defamatory, he is not subject to l i a b i l i t y for the factual 
statement--nor for the expression of opinion, so long as i t does 
not reasonably indicate an asser t ion of the existence of other, 
defamatory facts that would jus t i fy the forming of the opinion. 
Id. § 566, comment c(2) (emphasis added). That passage describes th i s case, 
in which the statement about respondent changing his posi t ion on municipal 
power i s not defamatory and the arguable implication tha t he misled his con-
s t i t uen t s i s expression of opinion. 
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Also instructive is Hustler Magazine, Inc. v, Falwell, 
485 U.S. 46 (1988), in part because Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote 
the opinion for a unanimous Court just two years before he 
authored Milkovich. The Court held that the First Amendment pro-
tected Hustler from liability for publishing a distasteful parody 
of a Campari Liqueur advertisement featuring Falwell in a mock 
interview in which he states that his "first time" (a sexual dou-
ble entendre) was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his 
mother in an outhouse. To ensure robust public debate and the 
necessary constitutional breathing space for the press, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist stressed that public figures must be able to 
prove that the statements are false. The statements about 
Falwell, however outrageous, could not reasonably be understood 
as actual fact. In a passage fitting for this case, the Court 
quoted Felix Frankfurter: one "'of the prerogatives of American 
citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures.'" 
485 U.S. at 51 (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 
665, 673-74 (1944)). 
Post-Milkovich decisions on opinion privilege demon-
strate that the statements at issue here are not actionable. For 
example, in Diez v. Pearson, 834 S.W.2d 250, 252-53 (Mo. App. 
1992), "inferences" "made in the context of signed letters to the 
editor of a newspaper" that a county commissioner's "activity 
constituted a story of lies and deceit . . . are inferences which 
cannot objectively and realistically be proven true or false" and 
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therefore were constitutionally privileged opinion. In Hunt v. 
University of Minnesota, 465 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. App. 1991), nega-
tive comments to a prospective employer that plaintiff "lacked 
warmth, was insincere, and had no sense of integrity," id. at 91, 
were held to be protected under Milkovich because "it is impossi-
ble to objectively verify Hunt's level of integrity," jld. at 94. 
In Mover v. Amador Valley High School, 18 Media L. Rep. [BNA] 
1602 (Cal. App. 1990), statements in a high school newspaper 
describing plaintiff as a "babbler" and "the worst teacher" in 
the school were held to be nonprovable and nonactionable facts 
under Milkovich. In Ward v. News Group Newspaper, Inc., 18 Media 
L. Rep. [BNA] 1140 (CD. Cal. 1990), the court applied Milkovich 
and found statements that plaintiff/s private life was "sordid" 
and "sure to shock millions" were not factually provable and 
therefore not actionable. Id. at 1142. 
This case and Milkovich are similar and different in 
very important respects. They are similar in that plaintiffs in 
each case claim that newspaper opinion columns imply defamatory 
information about them. They are different, however, because in 
Milkovich the Court determined that a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that the challenged statements implied that plaintiff 
had perjured himself in a judicial proceeding, and the connota-
tion that plaintiff had committed a felony was sufficiently fac-
tual to be susceptible of being proved true or false. In stark 
contrast, the purported connotation that plaintiff in the instant 
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case misled the voters about his position on municipal power can 
only be understood as conclusory opinion. 
Indeed, for statements that are not actionable for lack 
of provable fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist#s Milkovich analysis 
had a case like this in mind: one involving a connotation not 
susceptible to objective proof or disproof. As Judge Eves wrote 
in upholding summary judgment in this case, there can be no 
"independent objective proof" on the "subjective attitudes and 
representations" of respondent. Accordingly, "the statements 
regarding the mayor#s opinion on the position of municipal power 
do not contain a provable false factual connotation and 
. . . said statements are entitled to full constitutional protec-
tion." Memorandum Opinion at 3-4 (Oct. 17, 1990). 
II. FLAWS IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS/ ACTUAL MALICE ANALYSIS 
Amicus curiae SPJ wishes to focus on two flaws in the 
lower court's actual malice analysis that would have profound 
adverse consequences on reporting and editorial practices if 
allowed to stand. It bears repeating that "[t]he actual malice 
standard was created to protect the press from undue liability in 
publishing articles and material about public officials and pub-
lic figures." Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 200 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 15, 18 (1992). 
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A. The Court of Appeals Erroneously Suggested that Evi-
dence of the Press Seeking Legal Advice During the Edi-
t o r i a l Process i s Probative of Actual Malice. 
Although lacking prec i s ion on t h i s po int , the lower 
c o u r t ' s majority opinion appears t o suggest tha t prepubl icat ion 
l e g a l review of newspaper copy may be evidence of New York Times 
"actual malice": "knowledge that [the publ i ca t ion] was f a l s e or 
. . . r e c k l e s s disregard of whether i t was f a l s e or not ." 376 
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). West, 835 P.2d at 1 8 7 - 8 8 . 3 1 Any such 
suggest ion would turn New York Times on i t s head, undermine 
respons ib le report ing and e d i t o r i a l decision-making, and compro-
mise the a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p in the f i e l d of journalism. 
I f anything, evidence that a reporter or ed i tor con-
su l t ed counsel before publ icat ion should be probative that the 
reporter or ed i tor had not "in f a c t enterta ined ser ious doubts as 
t o the truth of the p u b l i c a t i o n . " St . Amant v. Thompson, 390 
U.S. 727, 731 ( 1 9 6 8 ) . 3 2 See Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 446, 
31The point lacks prec i s ion because on the very same page, the court below 
(1) concludes that the inference that the publisher "would not have consulted 
l ega l counsel i f he did not have serious doubts" was a "reasonable inference" 
that , along with others , "create[s ] a disputed question of f ac t ;" and 
(2) a s ser t s that the e d i t o r ' s re l iance on prepublicat ion l e g a l advice was 
"immaterial to the question of whether he personal ly had serious 
doubts. . . . " 835 P.2d at 188. As the ensuing d iscuss ion shows, the forego-
ing i s as faul ty as i t i s confused. 
Court of Appeals declared that "[w]e r e j e c t any argument that re l iance 
upon l ega l counsel somehow sh ie lds a defendant from a defamation s u i t . " West, 
835 P.2d at 188 n .9 . No one appears to making that argument. The troubling 
aspect of the Court of Appeals' analys i s i s the suggest ion that prepublication 
consul tat ion with counsel alone may ra i se a jury i s sue on the question of 
actual malice and thereby defeat a summary judgment motion. 
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453 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied. 111 S.Ct. 1071 (1991) 
(prepublication legal review "contravenes a finding of actual 
malice"). Courts have relied in part on evidence of 
prepublication legal review to grant summary judgment in libel 
cases on the ground of lack of actual malice. See, e.g., 
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 994 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Fadell v. Minneapolis Star & Tri-
bune Co., 425 F. Supp. 1075 (N.D. Ind. 1976), aff'd, 557 F.2d 107 
(7th Cir.) cert, denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Cardillo v. 
Doubledav & Co., 366 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 
638 (2d Cir. 1975) . 
Where, as here, a defamation defendant waives the 
attorney-client privilege and thereby subjects both attorney and 
client to discovery, this should demonstrate defendant's lack of 
subjective doubt in light of the reporter's or editor's caution 
and responsibility to review the proposed publication and its 
sources with counsel. See Sack, supra, at 221. Where, as here, 
with the attorney-client privilege waived, there is no evidence 
that defendant expressed doubt about accuracy to counsel or pub-
lished against advice of counsel or that counsel expressed con-
33 
cern about legal risk that went unheeded, it would be 
33ln Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 551 
F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert, denied sub nom. Hotchner v. Doubledav & Co,, 434 
U.S. 834 (1977), the trial judge denied summary judgment for defendant 
because, among other things, the publisher disclosed that its lawyers were 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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unprecedented for the fact of prepublication legal review to 
defeat summary judgment and create a jury issue on whether defen-
dant published with a "high degree of awareness of . . . probable 
falsity." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1976). 
The widespread practice of prepublication legal review 
is the product of news organizations seeking to secure their rep-
utations for "accuracy and fairness." Sanford, supra, at 50. The 
Court of Appeals' analysis would likely produce less responsible 
journalism by discouraging a reporter or editor facing legal 
uncertainty from seeking counsel out of fear that doing so would 
create defamation liability exposure. Not only would this hamper 
responsible editorial decisionmaking and compromise First Amend-
ment protections, it would undermine the policy underlying the 
attorney-client relationship of encouraging the client to engage 
in full and frank communication with counsel. When First Amend-
ment and attorney-client privilege issues intersect, the values 
underlying each should not both be compromised, and that is 
exactly what the Court of Appeals' analysis would do. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
concerned that the publication's statements "border on 'malice' (in the legal 
sense)." The publisher did revise the text, but did not intend to change the 
substance and did not further check the accuracy. 404 F. Supp. at 1048-49. 
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B. The Court of Appeals Erroneously Suggested that Publ i -
cat ion of a Rebuttal Letter t o the Editor I s Probative 
of Actual Malice, 
Again lacking d e f i n i t i v e n e s s , the majority opinion 
appears t o accept Mr. West's content ion that the Daily Spectrum's 
publ i ca t ion of h i s rebut ta l l e t t e r t o the e d i t o r , i r r e s p e c t i v e of 
i t s content , i s c ircumstant ia l evidence tha t an accompanying e d i -
t o r i a l was published with actual mal ice . West, 835 P.2d at 
34 189. The d e c i s i o n t o publ ish the l e t t e r , i f anything, e v i -
dences confidence in the accompanying column and a remarkable 
attempt t o be f a i r t o Mr. West. Courts genera l ly regard evidence 
of report ing both s i d e s of a controversy as demonstrating lack of 
35 actual mal ice . For example, m Roberts v . Dover, 525 F. Supp. 
987 (M.D. Tenn. 1981), a reporter contacted a highway patro l 
o f f i c e r and a truck dr iver . The driver claimed the patrolman had 
harassed him. The newspaper published an a r t i c l e report ing both 
^Regardless of the form -- l e t ter to the editor, face-to-face interview, 
telephone conversation, copies of pre-existing material -- rebuttal informa-
tion provided by the person who i s the subject of an art ic le to the publisher 
may create doubt about the accuracy of the work in progress and be probative 
of actual malice i f the publisher proceeds to publish in the face of this 
information. That i s not the issue raised here. The only question i s whether 
the publisher's decision to publish a rebuttal l e t ter to the editor i s i t s e l f 
evidence of actual malice. 
35gee Sanford, supra, at 411. Apart from what may be sound and responsible 
journalist ic practice, publishers are not constitutionally required to present 
a balanced presentation of the facts . If the publisher subjectively believes 
that the facts presented are accurate, i t i s not reckless disregard of the 
truth to report the facts se lect ive ly . That i s the lesson of Time, Inc. v. 
Page, 401 U.S. 279 (1971), in which the Supreme Court held that when the facts 
are ambiguous, the selection of the most damaging inferences for publication 
does not alone establish actual malice. 
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sides of the dispute, and the patrolman sued for defamation. The 
court granted summary judgment because the patrolman's "denials 
would not support an inference that [the reporter] acted with 
reckless disregard in writing a story containing both versions 
rather than withholding the story altogether." Id. at 992-93. 
The Court of Appeals' approach would discourage the 
press from publishing comment, even denials, from those who are 
the subject of critical reporting or from publishing information 
in the face of denials altogether because doing so would increase 
the risk of creating a jury issue on actual malice. Even worse, 
the lower court's treatment of this issue could impede 
newsgathering by dissuading reporters from contacting the sub-
jects of news reports to avoid having any rebuttal information at 
all. These deterrents hardly serve the core purpose of the New 
York Times First Amendment actual malice standard of diminishing 
"self-censorship." 376 U.S. at 279. Indeed, the Daily Spec-
trum's willingness to publish a letter from Mr. West furthers the 
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open." New 
York Times, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
III. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A STATEMENT 
THAT MR. WEST ATTEMPTED TO MANIPULATE THE PRESS IS CAPABLE 
OF DEFAMATORY MEANING. 
Utah law is unexceptionable in defining as libelous a 
publication that tends "to expose [the plaintiff] to public 
hatred, contempt or ridicule." Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-2(1) 
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(1988). The trial court in this case correctly and not surpris-
ingly held that the newspaper's allegation that Mr. West 
attempted to manipulate the press is not defamatory as a matter 
of law. However, the Court of Appeals, relying on a secondary 
dictionary definition rather than the political and editorial 
context in which the statement was made, reached the astonishing 
conclusion that this is a jury issue. West, 835 P.2d at 189-90. 
No politician or public official would welcome charges 
of manipulating the press, and many indeed may find such charges 
offensive. However, "[a] publication is not defamatory simply 
because it is nettlesome or embarrassing to a plaintiff, or even 
because it makes a false statement about the plaintiff." Cox v. 
Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988). As Judge Garff correctly 
concluded in his dissenting opinion in this case, "the statements 
are not defamatory as a matter of law because they do not 
'impeach [West's] honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation or 
publish his . . . defects or expose him . . . to public hatred, 
contempt or ridicule.'» (quoting Cox, 761 P.2d at 561, and cit-
ing Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-2(1) (1988)). West, 835 P.2d at 191. 
The literature on politics is replete with analyses and accounts 
of candidates and elected officials interacting with the press to 
36 gain political advantage. 
36E.g.
 t Paul Taylor, See How They Run: Electing the President in an Age of 
Mediaocracy (1990); Stephen Bates, News: The Politics of Illusion (1988); 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The context of the remarks i s c r u c i a l t o deciding 
whether the statements are merely c r i t i c a l l y unf la t t er ing or 
defamatory. See Sanford, supra, at 98. Courts frequently d i s -
miss as nonactionable sharp commentary made in the s e t t i n g of 
publ ic debate. For example, as noted prev ious ly , in Greenbelt 
Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bres ler , 398 U.S. 6 (1970), the 
Supreme Court of the United Sta tes found protected and n o n - l i b e l -
ous a newspaper's republ icat ion of a speaker's comment at a c i t y 
counci l meeting accusing the p l a i n t i f f of "blackmailing" the c i t y 
in pending n e g o t i a t i o n s . In a case d i r e c t l y on po in t , a radio 
s t a t i o n ' s a l l e g a t i o n that a mayor running for r e e l e c t i o n was a 
"deceptive individual" who "often mis leads , i f not b l a t a n t l y 
l i e s " t o reporters was found not l i b e l o u s . Craig v. Moore, 4 
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1402 (Fla. Cir. 1978). 
The Court of Appeals' a-contextual treatment of t h i s 
quest ion f l i e s in the face of e s tab l i shed defamation law that the 
words in quest ion "must be construed as a whole." Prosser and 
Keeton on Torts 781-82 (W. Page Keeton, e t a l . e d s . , 5th ed. 
1984) . The statement in quest ion here should be held t o be both 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
Charles Press & Kenneth VerBurg, American P o l i t i c i a n s and Journal i s t s (1988); 
Christopher F. Arterton, Media P o l i t i c s : The News Strateg ies of the Presiden-
t i a l Campaigns (1984); Timothy Crouse, The Boys on the Bus (1973); James M. 
Perry, Us and Them: How the Press Covered the 1972 Elect ion (1973). 
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37 
nondefamatory and protected opinion. On this issue the deci-
sion below conflicts with this Court's decision in Cox and with 
Milkovich as well. 
CONCLUSION 
This case has the potential to have a significant nega-
tive impact on press reporting about politics in the State of 
Utah and perhaps other jurisdictions as well. The Court of 
Appeals decision would likely induce press self-censorship in 
conflict with press freedoms guaranteed under Article I, section 
15, of the Utah Constitution and the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. For the foregoing reasons, amicus 
curiae SPJ respectfully urges this Court (1) to reject the analy-
sis of the Court of Appeals with respect to opinion privilege, 
actual malice, and defamatory meaning; (2) to reverse the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals insofar as it reverses the judgment 
of the trial court; and (3) to uphold the trial court1s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the petitioners. 
Respectfully submitted, 
December 23, 1992 
PATRICK A. SHEA 
rOTT M. MATHESON; JR. ¥ J 
Attorneys for Society of 
Professional Journalists, 
Amicus Curiae 
^'"The question 'what is a defamatory statement?' has always been closely 
related to the traditional distinction in defamation law between statements of 
'fact' and statements of 'opinion.'" Smolla, supra. § 4.01 at 4-3 (1992). 
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